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On Saturday 19 September 1931, 
C. S. Lewis and J. R. R. Tolkien bonded 
over the term mythopoeia (“myth-
making”) during their famous stroll down 
Addison’s Walk (Carpenter 42).  While on 
this walk, Lewis and Tolkien discussed 
how a storyteller “‘or sub-creator’ as 
Tolkien liked to call such a person, is 
actually fulfilling God’s purpose, and 
reflecting a splintered fragment of the 
true light” (43).  Lewis wrote to one of his 
dearest friends, Arthur Greeves, twelve 
days later, claiming that he went from 
believing in God to definitely believing in 
Christ (45).  While this event certainly 
reveals a theological standpoint of 
Tolkien and Lewis, the claim that humans 
fulfill God’s purpose by sub-creating 
implies another important aspect of their 
worldview: that humanity is somehow 
different from other creatures.1  Perhaps, 
as G. K. Chesterton remarks in The 
Everlasting Man, a text we know 
contributed to Lewis’ conversion, 
humanity is “the measure of all things” 
(35).  Measurement, of course, demands a 
scale from great to small—in this case, a 
hierarchy from the greatest of beings to 
the lowest.  Lewis, through his literature, 
reveals the significance of humanity in the 
hierarchy of the universe.  Within his core 
works, humanity’s significance may be 
observed in three contexts: humanity as a 
hybrid of bestial and divine; humanity as 
the protagonist of the Christian divine 
metanarrative; and humanity as a 
transformative creature. 
In a paradoxical statement—a 
style for which he is often recognized—
Chesterton sets the stage for Lewis when 
he notes the irony of the human animal: 
“the more we really look at man as an 
animal, the less he will look like one” (The 
Everlasting Man 27), for, as Chesterton 
further remarks in Orthodoxy, “we do not 
fit in to the world.  I had tried to be happy 
by telling myself that man is an animal, 
like any other which sought its meat from 
God.  But now I really was happy, for I had 
learnt that man is a monstrosity.  I had 
been right in feeling all things as odd, for I 
myself was at once worse and better than 
all things” (72-73).  Chesterton argues 
that humans are set apart from other 
creatures: “In so far as I am Man I am the 
chief of creatures….Man was a state of 
God walking about the garden.  Man had 
pre-eminence over all the brutes; man 
was only sad because he was not a beast, 
but a broken god” (Orthodoxy 87).2  
Humanity, thus, finds itself in a conflicted, 
paradoxical state of existence—between 
the earthly and the divine, the physical 
and the metaphysical. 
Lewis, likewise, recognizes the 
uniqueness of humans among all other 
creatures.  In Mere Christianity, Lewis 
states that a human “is subjected to 
various biological laws which he cannot 
disobey any more than an animal 
can…but the law which is peculiar to his 
human nature, the law he does not share 
with animals or vegetables or inorganic 
things, is the one he can disobey if he 
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chooses” (16)—what Lewis calls the Law 
of Nature, the Law of Descent Behaviour, 
or the Moral Law.  The Moral Law “is not 
any one instinct or set of instincts: it is 
something which makes a kind of tune 
(the tune we call goodness or right 
conduct) by directing the instincts)” (21).  
In regard to animals, humans are, as 
Ransom of That Hideous Strength states, 
“More.  But not less” (379).  The demon 
Screwtape describes humans quite well as 
amphibians, “half spirit and half 
animal…As spirits they belong to the 
eternal world, but as animals they inhabit 
time” (206).  Through Screwtape, Lewis 
further asserts that the hybrid quality of 
humans is the cause of Lucifer’s revolt.  
Humans, therefore, are hybrids of animal 
and spirit, time and eternity.  Bios is the 
term Lewis gives to the natural, animal 
side of humans which “is always tending 
to run down and decay so that it can only 
be kept up by incessant subsidies from 
Nature in the form of air, water, food, etc.” 
(Mere Christianity 131)  In regard to the 
spiritual side, however, Lewis uses the 
term Zoe to refer to the spiritual energy 
and knowledge which is of God (131).  
According to Lewis, because of the 
paradoxical presence of both Bios and Zoe 
in humans, humans are “the highest of the 
animals,” and “we get the completest 
resemblance to God which we know of” 
(131).  
The power of reason is often 
recognized as one of the characteristics 
that divides humanity from the rest of the 
animal Kingdom.  Agreeably, Lewis posits 
for two lobes of the human mind: while 
faith is built upon what is accepted in 
reason, “the battle is between faith and 
reason on one side and emotion and 
imagination on the other” (Mere 
Christianity 116).  The narrator of 
Perelandra, for example, calls the 
reasoning quadrant “a chattering part of 
the mind which continues, until it is 
corrected, to chatter on even in the 
holiest of places” (140).  Thus, while 
Ransom stands in the presence of 
Maleldil—or, God, in Lewis’ Space 
Trilogy—in a prayer, his calculating side 
continued to “pour queries and objections 
into his brain” in order to combat his faith 
(141).  His reason, at this moment, is 
wrestling with his faith. 
Lewis further portrays the 
divisions of the human mind in That 
Hideous Strength when Jane is given 
direction from Ransom; while one part of 
herself is completely receptive to 
Ransom, another seeks to control the 
situation, another produced moral 
confusion, and still a final portion felt joy 
(150-51).  Characters like Jane and, later 
in the story, Mark experience a division of 
mind; one part reasons the event and 
contexts while the other expresses 
feelings about the event.  One must, 
eventually, choose a side.  When Mark is 
overcome by reason and its parallel with 
emotion, he had “his first deeply moral 
experience.  He was choosing a side: the 
Normal.  ‘All that,’ as he called it, was 
what he chose.  If the scientific point of 
view led away from ‘all that,’ then be 
damned to the scientific point of view” 
(294).  Mark, thus, chooses the irrational, 
yet reasonable side: the “normal.”  He 
decides against what science, stimulus, 
and evidence might suggest in the 
rational point of view; Mark, instead, 
exercises reason, faith, emotion, and 
imagination together to accept divine 
truth. 
Mark’s reasoning may be sharply 
contrasted to the actions of dear Mr. 
Bultitude, the “great snuffly, wheezly, 
beady-eyed, loose-skinned, gor-bellied 
brown bear,” who is treated kindly and 
pronounced a safe animal (164).  The 
wizard Merlin prophesizes the 
significance of the bear’s role in the story 
of the world: “He said that before 
Christmas this bear would do the best 
deed that any bear had done in Britain 
except some other bear that none of us 
had ever heard of” (282).  His “mind was 
as furry and as unhuman in shape as his 
body,” having no ability to remember 
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much of his history, to recognize himself 
as a bear and his caretakers as humans, or 
to know that he did love and trust his 
caretakers: “The words I and Me and Thou 
was absent from his mind” (306).  He is 
incapable of asking the question “why?” 
(307)  Mr. Bultitude is, in fact, only a bear, 
able to feel Ivy’s love and care but unable 
to comprehend it (308), for he possessed 
“an inarticulate want for human 
companionship to which he was 
accustomed...[and] sorrow such as only 
animals know—huge seas of disconsolate 
emotion with not one little raft of reason 
to float on” (350).  The bear’s inability to 
reason, however, is what most separates 
him from humans; thus, his part in the 
story consists of ruthless killings of the 
Belbury group members.  In the midst of 
his slaughtering of humans, “The pride 
and insolent glory of the beast, the 
carelessness of its killings, seemed to 
crush his spirit even as its flat feet were 
crushing women and men.  Here surely 
came the King of the world…then 
everything went black and he knew no 
more” (350).  Mr. Bultitude cannot 
comprehend his emotion; he can only act.  
He lacks the reason, faith, imagination, 
and emotional awareness that Lewis 
believes to be part of humanity. 
The animal’s inability to reason is 
not the only characteristic which 
separates humans from beasts; Lewis also 
notes the ability to create art as a point of 
separation from beasts.  To aid his 
position, Lewis defines the words creating 
and begetting: “To beget is to become the 
father of: to create is to make.  And the 
difference is this.  When you beget, you 
beget something of the same kind as 
yourself.  A man begets human 
babies….But when you make, you make 
something of a different kind from 
yourself” (Mere Christianity 130).  Any 
animal can reproduce, but humans are the 
only animals who can really create.3 
Humanity is certainly the highest 
of animals; in regard to the divine, 
however, humanity is at the base of the 
hierarchy.  When explaining the 
relationship between God and humans, 
Lewis personifies God: “Let us pretend 
that this is not a mere creature, but our 
Son.  It is like Christ in so far as it is a Man, 
for He became Man.  Let us pretend that it 
is also like Him in Spirit.  Let us treat it as 
if it were what in fact it is not.  Let us 
pretend in order to make the pretence 
into a reality” (155).  Sandwiched 
between the animals and the divine, 
humanity dresses up to be like Sons of 
God when, in fact, they are incomplete 
Sons of God.  Humanity, as you recall, 
relies on Bios and must be fed Zoe 
through God.  Humanity may rise or fall in 
that hierarchy: traveling beastward or 
into the holy.  As Donald T. Williams 
writes in Mere Humanity, “In summary, to 
be human is to be an animal who is more, 
who has also a spiritual nature and is 
therefore aware of and accountable to 
follow spiritual values” (33). 
Humans, thus, have a choice 
whether to accept the role of a Son or 
Daughter of God.  Again, addressing the 
reader through a persona of God, “Make 
no mistake…if you let me, I will make you 
perfect.  The moment you put yourself in 
my hands, that is what you are in for.  
Nothing less, or other, than that.  You 
have free will, and if you choose you can 
push Me away.  But if you do not push Me 
away, understand that I am going to see 
this job through” (161).  Accordingly, one 
has a choice either to follow God’s 
purpose to perfection or not to do so; 
there is no neutral ground.  As Camilla 
remarks to Jane in That Hideous Strength, 
“Don’t you see…that you can’t be neutral?  
If you don’t give yourself to us, the enemy 
will use you” (115).  Alan Jacobs placed 
Lewis’ worldview in terms of “forks” 
yesterday, not unlike the direction we are 
going here. 
In agreement with Process 
Theology, Lewis posits that everyone is 
moving in one direction or the other, 
either toward or away from God, 
participating in a divine metanarrative.  
4
A Meaningful Hierarchy · Zach A. Rhone 
Some are Christians but losing their 
Christianity; others may not dare call 
themselves Christians but are on their 
way there (Mere Christianity 165).  The 
middle is a dangerous place to be, 
however, whether one is moving toward 
or away from God.  Screwtape remarks, 
“Indeed the safest road to Hell is the 
gradual one—the gentle slope, soft 
underfoot, without sudden turnings, 
without milestones, without signposts” 
(Screwtape 220).  In Lewis’ view, while 
one is constantly traveling in either 
direction, she must choose a side both 
definitively and purposefully. 
Although Process Theology seems 
tangential to our discussion of the 
significance of humanity, Lewis argues 
that one’s journey toward or away from 
God is what makes humanity especially 
significant.  Individually, humans have the 
unique opportunity, unlike any other 
animal, to become more and more 
spiritual until, ultimately, becoming 
supernatural: “He is beginning to turn you 
into the same kind of thing as Himself.  He 
is beginning, so to speak, to ‘inject’ His 
kind of life and thought, His Zoe, into you; 
beginning to turn the tin soldier into a live 
man” (Mere Christianity 153).  The 
Christian becomes more spiritual, more 
alive, and more knowledgeable in the way 
that God is the way, the life, and the 
truth—but on a smaller scale, for 
“Christianity thinks of human individuals 
not as mere members of a group or items 
in a list, but as organs in a body—
different from one another and each 
contributing what no other could” (149).  
The part of humanity who journeys 
toward God must unite with one another, 
existing as a part of the body of Christ in 
the world.  The individual journey 
becomes a journey together.  As Lewis 
writes, “If you could see humanity spread 
out in time, as God sees it, it would not 
look like a lot of separate things dotted 
about.  It would look like on single 
growing thing—rather like a very 
complicated tree.  Every individual would 
appear connected with every other” (146-
47), or as Screwtape claims, humans “are 
to be one with Him, but yet themselves” 
(207).  Humans, while individual and 
separate from one another, are a part of 
the whole of humanity; God, accordingly, 
seeks to make humans more like Himself: 
one who is more than one.  Essentially, 
each person must contribute his or her 
part of the body to fulfill the task of that 
organ, as Paul writes of the church in 1 
Corinthians 12.12-27.  Lewis admits, 
“Christians are Christ’s body, the 
organism through which He works.  Every 
addition to that body enables Him to do 
more” (Mere Christianity 60).  Humanity 
is, essentially, the protagonist of a divine 
metanarrative— moving either away 
from God and toward isolation or away 
from isolation and toward God with His 
presence on earth through the Church. 
While each person may have a 
place in the body of Christ and in the 
divine metanarrative, Lewis asserts that 
finding and accepting one’s place in the 
narrative is sometimes difficult.  In 
Perelandra, for example, Ransom 
struggles with his position in the body of 
the church.  Amidst discursive arguments 
between himself and the Un-man, Ransom 
questions God: 
Why did no miracle come?  Or 
rather, why no miracle on the right 
side?  For the presence of the 
Enemy was in itself a kind of 
Miracle.  Had Hell a prerogative to 
work wonders?  Why did Heaven 
work none?  Not for the first time 
he found himself questioning 
Divine Justice.  He could not 
understand why Maleldil should 
remain absent when the Enemy 
was there in person.  (140) 
As he is mentally grumbling about God’s 
inactivity in the events around him, 
Ransom suddenly “knew that Maleldil 
was not absent” (140).  Within moments, 
Ransom realizes that, while the Un-man 
was the ambassador of Hell, “That miracle 
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on the right side, which he had demanded, 
had in fact occurred.  He himself was the 
miracle” (141).  Following his epiphany, 
Ransom accepts his role in the Christian 
body—to be God’s representative in the 
fight over the Lady of Perelandra; 
ultimately, if Perelandra’s fate “lay in 
Maleldil’s hands, Ransom and the Lady 
were those hands” (142). 
Ransom discovers his role as what 
Lewis terms the “New Man”—that is, 
Ransom acts as one of God’s children: 
“God became man to turn creatures into 
sons: not simply to produce better men of 
the old kind but to produce a new kind of 
man.  It is not like teaching a horse to 
jump better and better but like turning a 
horse into a winged creature….It is not 
mere improvement but Transformation” 
(Mere Christianity 170-71).4  When God 
has been given the submission and 
willingness of humans to become the New 
Human, he infects us with his energy, joy, 
wisdom, and love to make us into gods 
and goddesses reflective of the God.  As 
Lewis notes, “The process will be long and 
in parts very painful, but that is what we 
are in for” (163).  But, as the New Humans 
admit in Perelandra, “it is He who is 
strong and makes me strong” (66). 
Empowered by and reflecting God, 
each New Human has a special plan and 
purpose in the divine metanarrative as a 
part of the church.  Lewis argues that as 
each person has a different command, 
each person has a different set of rules 
and responsibilities.  On Perelandra, for 
example, “Maleldil has forbidden in one 
what He allows in another” (Perelandra 
75).  This is not to be confused with 
relativist morality but understood that 
Lewis is describing the different purposes 
for the various parts of the body of the 
Church.  On Perelandra (Mars), the Lady 
is forbidden to be on fixed land and must 
remain on floating lands until she is 
rejoined with her King; on Thulcandra 
(Earth), humans are permitted to reside 
on fixed lands: nothing else exists!  Lewis, 
thus, is not arguing for relativist morality; 
instead, he posits that each person has a 
unique command, forbidding, and overall 
purpose as individual parts of the body of 
the church.  Accordingly, the Lady 
comments, “I am His beast, and all His 
biddings are joys” (76).  The joy of 
obeying Christ’s biddings—that is the joy 
which Lewis believes we all should have. 
 The joy the Lady finds in 
obedience to God is like the New Human’s 
joy; in Mere Christianity, Lewis writes, “To 
become new men means losing what we 
now call ‘ourselves’….The more we get 
what we now call ‘ourselves’ out of the 
way and let Him take us over, the more 
truly ourselves we become” (175).  In a 
sense, humanity has embraced the half-
animal side rather than the half-spiritual 
side; by giving it all over, Lewis believes 
that one can discover her true self: “Until 
you have given up your self to Him you 
will not have a real self” (176). 
But where does this loss of self 
leave the animal side of the human?  What 
about the human’s responsibility as a 
creature of God as well as a Son of God?  
The third element of humanity’s 
significance in the hierarchy of the divine 
metanarrative, according to Lewis, is the 
mastering of animals.  Donald T. Williams 
asserts that Lewis means leadership 
rather than mastering in terms of slavery, 
the word which Lewis repeatedly uses 
(97-98); however, I do not believe that 
the term leadership reaches as far as 
Lewis intends.  In Mere Christianity, Lewis 
uses the metaphor of a human’s 
relationship with a dog: “We treat our 
dogs as if they were ‘almost human’: that 
is why they really become ‘almost human’ 
in the end” (155).  A dog’s knowledge 
does not result from setting an example, 
as leadership might imply; rather, the 
knowledge to be more human-like is a 
result of being treated humanly: “I think I 
can see how the higher animals are in a 
sense drawn into Man when he loves 
them and makes them (as he does) much 
more nearly human than they would 
otherwise be” (159). 
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In the same way that God treats 
humans with the potential of rising in the 
hierarchy, humans are supposed to act as 
beastmasters by training the beasts to be 
more human-like.  Ransom, likewise, 
states to the Lady of Perelandra, “The 
beasts in your world seem almost 
rational” to which the Lady responds, “We 
make them older every day….Is not that 
what it means to be a beast?” (Perelandra 
65)  Accordingly, the King of Perelandra 
states, “We will make the nobler of the 
beasts so wise that they will become hnau 
and speak: their lives shall awake to a 
new life in us as we awake in Maleldil” 
(211).  Lewis, therefore, posits that hnau, 
including humans, must take care of the 
world around them, for “beasts must be 
ruled by hnau and hnau by eldila and 
eldila by Maleldil” (Out of the Silent Planet 
102).  One does not have to search far in 
Lewis’ canon to find examples of the 
beast-mastering principle: from Shasta 
and Bree in The Horse and His Boy to the 
cabby’s horse-turned-unicorn in The 
Magician’s Nephew to Ransom and Mr. 
Bultitude in That Hideous Strength. 
Perhaps Ransom articulates 
humanity’s place in the hierarchy best as 
the eldila—the angels of the Space 
Trilogy—and the animals gather around 
the humans in Lewis’ That Hideous 
Strength: “We are now as we ought to 
be—between the angels who are our 
elder brothers and the beasts who are our 
jesters, servants and playfellows” (378).  
The true New Human, who, like Ransom, 
follows the Law of Human Nature, 
submits himself to God, and shepherds 
the lesser animals, will eventually pass 
into heaven, becoming full of Zoe.  As the 
hrossa sing during the funeral service in 
Out of the Silent Planet, “Let it go down; 
the hnau rises from it” (131).  Lewis 
posits, through the words of Ransom, that 
heaven removes the “present functions 
and appetites of the human body” and 
takes us into heaven as one of heaven’s 
own (32).  Accordingly, the last of Ransom 
is a kind farewell to all of his house before 
the descent of the vessel which is to take 
him into the Deep Heaven, entering into 
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1 Lewis and Tolkien were not validating a 
humanistic philosophy like that which affirms 
humans as perfect; rather, as will be further 
discussed, the authors posited humanity’s 
significance and purpose in the story of the 
universe. 
2 In discussing the development of humanity, 
Chesterton, unavoidably, deals with 
evolutionary theory; accordingly, he wrote 
The Everlasting Man to combat the “vague 
notion” of evolution (71).  Evolutionary 
theory, for Chesterton, is vague for its lack of 
evidence.  Because science devalues the 
Creation story for the absence of empirical 
evidence, Chesterton argues, “There is not a 
shadow of evidence that this thing [human] 
was evolved at all.  There is not a particle of 
proof that this transition came slowly, or even 
that it came naturally.  In a strictly scientific 
sense, we simply know nothing whatever 
about how it grew, or whether it grew, or 
what it is” (38).  In regard to the evolutionary 
assumption that humans are the same as any 
other animal, he writes about the superiority 
of humans over animals: 
We can accept man as a fact, if we are 
content with an unexplained fact.  We 
can accept him as an animal, if we can 
live with a fabulous animal.  But if we 
must needs have sequence and 
necessity, then indeed, we must 
provide a prelude and crescendo of 
mounting miracles, that ushered in 
with unthinkable thunders in all the 
seven heavens of another order, a man 
may be an ordinary thing.  (39) 
Although confusing, the statement essentially 
claims that humans are superior from 
whatever perspective the race is viewed—as 
fact or animal; however, if one establishes a 
process of evolution from animals to humans, 
then the uniqueness of humans is entirely 
lost, for humans are only another link in the 







                                                                   
3 Certainly, other animals can create, but they 
do so with a very limited capacity.  Chesterton 
notes in The Everlasting Man that “the very 
fact that birds do build nests is one of those 
similarities that sharpen the startling 
difference.  The very fact that the bird can get 
as far as building a nest, and cannot get any 
farther, proves that he has not a mind as man 
has a mind; it proves it more completely than 
if he built nothing at all” (37). 
4 Terry Glaspey in Not a Tame Lion, cites 
Eustace’s transformation into a dragon in The 
Voyage of the Dawn Treader as an example of 
how transformation can, similarly, happen in 
reverse.  Lewis may have adapted this concept 
from MacDonald.  Lina, for example, has the 
appearance of a dog but the soul of a child 
who “was naughty, but is now growing good” 
(137). 
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